3. Some of these programs have worked well, while other have floundered, because either robust markets have failed to develop or participants have figured out ways to exploit the system, legally or illegally, in ways that undercut both efficiency and program effectiveness goals.
4. The latter flaw highlights the need for the careful design of market-based programs to minimize opportunities for participants to exploit markets for financial gain at the expense of the broader public interest.
E. The Market-Based Component of Wetlands Preservation Regulations
1. The wetlands protection program of the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), also known as the § 404 or dredge and fill permit program, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, provides insights into how regulators may be able to design programs that achieve the efficiency that environmental markets promise, while rooting out abuses of the system.
2. Any market-based environmental program should include five critical safeguards to ensure accountability and minimize opportunities for abuse: financial safeguards, verifiable performance standards, transparency and public participation safeguards, regulatory oversight mechanisms, and rule of law safeguards.
3. The dredge and fill program has succeeded in incorporating effective accountability safeguards in some of these areas, but not others.
II. Ecosystem Services and Markets

A. Ecosystem Services
1. Healthy natural systems have great value to humans. These values are often referred to as "ecosystem services," or the benefits that people obtain from natural ecosystems. 3 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: POLICY RESPONSES, at vii (Kanchan Chopra et al. eds., 2005) , http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.772.aspx.pdf.
2. To the extent that environmental laws preserve valuable ecosystem services, they enhance, not detract from economic value.
3. Ecosystem services fall into four categories: (1) supporting services, (2) provisioning services, (3) regulating services, and (4) cultural services.
4. As one scholar has explained, " [t] he concept behind ecosystem services is very simple -the environment offers critically important services for free that, if we had to pay for substitutes in markets, would command extremely high prices. 
B. Protection of Ecosystem Services through Markets
1. Market-based programs in ecosystem services seek to protect the value of these services from development or pollution by commodifying them.
2. Payments for ecosystem services can occur through business-to-business deals, the development of mitigation markets, the provision of government subsidies, or competitive grant programs.
3. Landowners who agree not to develop resources which they are otherwise free to develop free of legal constraint receive development "credits," which can then be sold to other regulated entities. The purchasers can use the credits to satisfy regulatory obligations that otherwise would have precluded them from developing their own land.
C. Protecting Wetlands to Preserve Ecosystem Services
1. Wetlands -once called swamps or bogs -used to be regarded as foul smelling and unhealthy breeding grounds for mosquitos, vermin, and disease. They were also seen as obstacles to economically beneficial development. Governments therefore made efforts to drain them, as quickly as possible.
2.
Both scientists and policymakers now realize that wetlands provide many valuable ecosystem services, including storm surge buffering, flood prevention, soil retention, water purification, aquifer recharge, fish and wildlife habitat, and carbon absorption.
D. The § 404 Dredge and Fill Permit Program
1. Wetlands protection in the U.S. is driven largely by § 404 of the federal CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, the source of the dredge and fill permit program.
2. Section 404 prohibits the development through dredging or filling of privately owned wetlands without a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps administers the § 404 permit program using guidelines developed by the federal EPA, which has the authority to veto individual § 404 permits. Id. § 1344(b), (j). 3. Developers may meet their § 404 obligations by using the credits they purchase from such banks to offset the wetlands they develop.
4. Such a transaction shifts legal responsibility for compliance with regulatory mitigation duties from the permit-holding developer to the mitigation banker.
5. This program is capable of achieving wetlands protection more efficiently than a system without trading because the banker can take advantage of economies of scale to provide relatively low-cost compensatory mitigation. 
III. The Risks of Regulatory Ecosystem Service Markets
A. Opportunities for Fraud
1. The collapse of the savings and loan industry and of mortgage markets has made policymakers well acquainted with the dangers of markets, especially in newly created, intangible goods. The risk of manipulation is inherent in the operation of markets, and environmental regulatory markets are no exception.
2. Participants in environmental trading markets have sometimes been paid for making environmental improvements they would have made anyway (and sometimes were already required to make), "double-dipping" by making improvements for which they have already been fully paid in the same or another market, or engaging in purely "paper trades" based on no real world environmental improvements. c. Asian companies produced HFC-23 so that they could destroy it to generate credits that could be sold under the CDM. These companies had no interest in manufacturing coolants, and intentionally used inefficient manufacturing processes to generate as much waste HFC-23 as they could. They even shut down each year as soon as they sold the maximum amount of HFC-23 credits allowed under the program.
d. The companies produced so much coolant in generating HFC-23 credits that the price of coolants fell, which discouraged airconditioning companies from developing more efficient and less environmentally damaging alternatives to the coolant. a. To combat smog in southern California, state regulators adopted Rule 1610, which allowed emission trading between mobile and stationary sources, both of which emit ozone precursors that contributed to noncompliance with the Clean Air Act's national ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).
b. Rule 1610 allowed factories to avoid installing expensive pollution controls by purchasing credits generated by the destruction of highpolluting cars (and measured by the projected avoided emissions from the destroyed vehicles).
c. The trading program sought to induce the owners of high-polluting, older vehicles to take them off the road, which reduces emissions more cheaply than requiring factories to curtail smokestack emissions through technological fixes.
d. But many of the cars whose avoided emissions generated credits were already destined for destruction for reasons having nothing to do with pollution control. Some of those who sold credits crushed the bodies of the cars but sold the engines for reuse in other cars still on the roads. 4. In short, market-based mechanisms create financial incentives to trade nonexistent credits that cost nothing to generate.
5. This dynamic means that market-based programs will achieve efficient and effective environmental protection only if they are designed to enable the government to identify, halt, and punish those who profit from phony reductions or otherwise game the system.
IV. Accountability Safeguards
A. Market-Based Programs: Potential and Pitfalls 1. The prerequisites to well-functioning markets of any kind include a stable political environment, well-defined private property rights, and adequate financial support for proper administration. Absent these factors, markets may appear to be unpredictable and unreliable, which will impair trading and reduce its capacity to promote efficiency-inducing exchanges.
2. But an efficient and effective market for protecting ecosystem services requires more to avoid exploitation that subverts regulatory goals. Environmental markets should include institutional safeguards in the form of financial responsibility requirements, verifiable performance standards, transparency and public participation standards, regulatory oversight mechanisms, and rule of law safeguards. 
B. Financial Safeguards
C. Verifiable Performance Standards
1. Most traditional U.S. environmental regulatory programs rely on performance standards, which require regulated entities to achieve the level of pollution control or environmental protection needed to achieve regulatory goals, but afford those entities the discretion to choose how they will do so. a. The agency responsible for administering a trading program must promulgate general rules establishing the minimum conditions for trading that will achieve desired levels of protection, and determine whether individual proposed trades satisfy those requirements and will actually provide the promised environmental services.
b. Detailed rules can reduce flexibility and hamper useful trades. In addition, extensive review of individual trades will generate high transaction costs, blocking some beneficial trades that are too costly to arrange and implement. But the absence of regulatory detail and meaningful review of individual trades creates opportunities for abuse.
Corps of Engineers regulations include performance standards for wetlands mitigation trades under the § 404 program.
a. Trading parties must prepare baseline inventories of existing aquatic resources and identify immediate and long-term resource needs that can be met through mitigation projects. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(c)(2)(iv).
b. The regulations prohibit the same credits being used to provide mitigation for more than one permitted activity. But they allow compensatory mitigation projects, where appropriate, to "be designed to holistically address requirements under multiple programs and authorities for the same activity." Id. § 332.3(j)(1)(ii). It is not clear whether such "holistic" endeavors leave the program open to manipulation.
c. The Corps' rules require identification of the parties responsible for implementation and long-term management of compensatory mitigation projects. Id. § 332.3(l)(1).
d. Permit applicants must prepare a mitigation plan to ensure long-term protection of the compensatory mitigation project site. Each plan must describe the legal arrangements and instrument that will be used to ensure long-term protection of the mitigation project site; include an adaptive management plan to address unforeseen changes in site conditions; and provide other information needed to determine the appropriateness, feasibility, and practicability of the compensatory mitigation project. Id. § 332.4(c).
e. The plan also must include verifiable performance standards that can be assessed using the best available science so that regulators may determine whether compensatory mitigation is providing the desired and expected wetlands functions, and is attaining applicable metrics (e.g., # of viable wetlands acres). Id. § 332.5(a).
f. These "objective and verifiable" standards may be based on measures of functional capacity described in terms of hydrological or other aquatic resource characteristics, or comparisons to reference aquatic resources of similar type and landscape position. Id. § 332.5(b). a. Transparency allows the public to gauge whether trades are consistent with regulatory goals and standards.
D. Transparency and Participation Safeguards
b. The dangers of lack of transparency are illustrated by a rapid rise in the price of credits for the manufacture or importation of gasoline blended with ethanol or other renewable fuels in 2013. The market for these credits is connected to the renewable fuels standards adopted under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, discussed above.
c. The price of ethanol credits jumped 20-fold in 2013. Some attribute the steep rise to hoarding of credits by big banks and other financial institutions precisely when the petroleum industry was reaching the limit of the amounts of ethanol that could be blended into gasoline without requiring the installation of new corrosion prevention systems. 3. Government overseers benefits from public participation, which can generate information about the costs and benefits of both general trading rules and individual trades of which the agency may not be aware.
a. Public input may illuminate the comparative merits and opportunity costs of developing alternative sites may be assessed. Public participation also tends to enhance legitimacy and social acceptance. d. Opportunities to provide input on individual trades is not always as good, but the CWA wetlands mitigation regulations require that the Corps provide public notice of (and solicit public comment on) a proposed permit, including a description of any proposed compensatory mitigation or intent to use a mitigation bank or in-lieu fee program. 33 U.S.C. § 332.4(b)(1).
e. The regulations also allow other federal and state agencies with environmental expertise to provide comments on proposed trades, and the Corps has created a dispute resolution process to resolve disagreements between the Corps and other agencies such as EPA or the Fish and Wildlife Service. 33 C.F.R. § 332.8(e).
E. Regulatory Oversight Mechanisms (Monitoring and Inspections)
1. Access to information is a prerequisite to effective oversight by either the government or the public. That access can include mandatory monitoring, reporting, government inspections, and verification that the promised ecosystem services actually are being provided. Without accurate monitoring data, the integrity of the allowance market is compromised.
2. The Corps' § 404 regulations require each mitigation plan to contain monitoring requirements to help determine whether mitigation is on track to meet performance standards and whether mid-term adjustments through adaptive management are needed. Id. § § 332.4(c)(1), 332.6(a)(1). 
V. Conclusion
A. Protecting Ecosystem Services through Markets
1. The use of markets in ecosystem protection programs can promote efficiency, but also entails risks. Trading participants may engage in abuses that escape the attention of regulatory overseers.
2.
The need for program elements that promote accountability is therefore perhaps even more important than for other regulatory programs that may be premised on better understandings of the causes and effects of environmental harms.
B. A Work in Progress
1. The final word on the efficacy of § 404 trades in protecting the ecosystem services provided by wetlands has yet to be written.
2. The § 404 mitigation trading program has many of the elements of an accountable market device, but the agency's supervision and enforcement of compensatory mitigation plans appear to need beefing up if abuses are to be avoided, and congressional funding cuts may hamper the ability of both EPA and the Corps to create effective deterrents to actions that undercut the program's protective goals.
